Conclusion There is no question that Hick's theory rests upon multiple assumptions about a singular, transcendental grounding and the fundamental equality of the various religions that cannot be inductively verified beyond all doubt. That need not mean, however, that the attractiveness of his theory derives solely from the peculiar charm of supposing that the One and the Many are no more at odds in the realm of religion than anywhere else. For Hick's assumptions are not just an exercise in wishful thinking or wild speculation. They are based upon experience from within what he calls the benign circle of faith. Because the reality experienced is ambiguous, acceptance or rejection of his views will, of course, be a matter of choice. And, admittedly, this choice will be dictated not so much by a weighing of empirical evidence that might prove the various religions to be exactly as he sees them, as by a consideration of what we have been surveying in the preceding pages, namely, the import of seeing things as Hick does.